¿Cuál debe ser la actitud de un pensamiento genuinamente postmoderno ante el fenómeno religioso? ¿Debe contribuir a desterrarlo de nuestras sociedades (en alianza con cierto racionalismo ilustrado que siempre miró con suspicacia cuanto no cabía dentro de sus estrechos criterios) o, por el contrario, debe colaborar en su emergente renacimiento (y aliarse, por tanto, con los diversos tradicionalismos que lo reivindican)? La filosofía de Gianni Vattimo constituye una respuesta a esta disyuntiva (típicamente moderna) desde una perspectiva que pretende distorsionar (...) (verwinden) tal dicotomía. La idea clave para ello es el concepto de secularización que, a la vez que reconoce nuestra dependencia, como occidentales, de un cierto discurso religioso, lo debilita con el fin de eliminar de él su violencia (pues, de modo circular, reconoce que dentro de él ya existía in nuce el proyecto de esta eliminación, el proyecto de la kénosis). El presente artículo analiza someramente estas ideas y traza algunas de sus conexiones (no siempre explicitadas por el propio Vattimo) con el pensamiento teológico más reciente, para después reseñar algunas de las consecuencias que han tenido en los debates filosóficos hispanos. (shrink)

Desiderius Erasmus considered that the education of children has to start at an early age. To get a better understanding of Erasmus’ theories about the education, this paper analyses the use of his term eruditio, but also the use of terms such as ratio, usus and philosophia. The aim is to point out the interesting link between the contemporary understanding of critical thinking and Erasmus’ concept of eruditio. Furthermore, for a better understanding of his perception of education, we analyse Erasmus’ (...) description of characteristics of a good teacher. Here mentioned description of a good teacher, in some aspects, link Erasmus with contemporary theorists such as John Dewey and Oscar Brenifier. As early training and practice for the development of a proper inference, Erasmus suggests fables, language exercises and proverbs, which is similar to what contemporary theorists and practitioners of critical thinking and philosophy with children do. (shrink)

Medvedev's intermediate logic (MV) can be defined by means of Kripke semantics as the family of Kripke frames given by finite Boolean algebras without units as partially ordered sets. The aim of this paper is to present a proof of the theorem: For every set of connectives such that the-fragment ofMV equals the fragment of intuitionistic logic. The final part of the paper brings the negative solution to the problem set forth by T. Hosoi and H. Ono, namely: is an (...) intermediate logic based on the axiom (abc) (ab)(a c) separable? (shrink)

In this paper we define the relation t of elementary extension of topological models in the language L t and show a Back and Forth criterion for t. We introduce some new operations on partial homeomorphisms preserving Back and Forth properties. Some properties of t are proved by the Back and Forth technique.

The debate on feminism and ‘religion’ has rarely been suggested as a critique of modernity that has silenced other possible cultural, epistemological and spiritual options. Efforts have been made to ascertain whether ‘religion’ is ‘good’ or ‘bad’ for – or indeed an ally or threat to – women’s liberation. More specifically, in a European context, contemporary discussions of ‘religion’ and the rights of women have been very much centred on Islam. Yet, none of these narratives have resolved the intrinsic colonial (...) character of modernity. This article explores the debate on both Islamic and Western feminism from a decolonial perspective. It argues that today, feminist theory faces the tremendous challenge of how to encounter the colonial and not only redefine, but also review the concepts and categories upon which Western feminism bases its arguments. Drawing on the work of the Spanish-Syrian Islamic decolonial thinker, Sirin Adlbi Sibai, this article develops a critical, self-reflexive approach that questions secular assumptions regarding feminist analyses of ‘religion’. In doing so, I present the decolonising of feminism as an invitation to (re)imagine our feminist encounters. (shrink)

This insight to art came from chess composition concentrating art in a very dense form. To identify and mathematically assess the uniqueness is the key applicable to other areas eg. computer programming. Maximization of uniqueness is minimization of entropy that coincides as well as goes beyond Information Theory (Shannon, 1948). The reusage of logic as a universal principle to minimize entropy, requires simplified architecture and abstraction. Any structures (e.g. plugins) duplicating or dividing functionality increase entropy and so unreliability (eg. British (...) Airways IT system). The ideas here were verified by my chess compositions, art works and complex information system as an author of each co uk, and were presented at conferences in Santorini, Adelaide, Geneva, Daejon and virtually. (shrink)

The richer you are, the less equally rich or richer people. The richest is only one (=unique). Maximization of richness or leisure (=classic utility), maximizes the uniqueness (=improbability) that can be maximized also by: extreme sport, suicide, tattoo, count of views... The richest seem unique as the poorest, but the rich can easily become poor, while the poor can hardly get rich. So the aim of maximization reflects IQ and options. Few options increase irrationality, regardless of IQ. I also present (...) the law of values' equality, Utility of Suicide, motivation to support the better, and overview the economics as such. Presented as PhD thesis at CERGE-EI, 2000, exhibited in Holland Park, W8 6LU, 2013, presented at conferences in Santorini 2016, Daejon 2016, Adelaide 2016. (shrink)

The article presents the chess composition as a logical art, with concrete examples. It began with Arabic mansuba, and later evolved to new-strategy designed by Italian Alberto Mari. The redefinition of mate (e.g. mate with a free field) or a theme to quasi-pseudo theme, opens the new space for combinations, and enables to connect it with other fields like computer science. The article was exhibited in Holland Park, W8 6LU, The Ice House between 18. Oct - 3. Nov. 2013.

This paper is concerned with the semantics of bare plural I-generics such as ‘Tigers are striped’, ‘Chickens lay eggs’, and ‘Kangaroos live in Australia’. In a series of recent papers, Bernhard Nickel has developed a comprehensive view of a certain class of bare plural I-generics, which he calls characterizing sentences :629–648, 2009. doi:10.1007/s10988-008-9049-7; Linguist Philos 33:479–512, 2010a. doi:10.1007/s10988-011-9087-4; Philos Impr 10:1–25, 2010b). Nickel’s ambitious proposal includes a detailed account of their truth-conditions, an account of certain pragmatic phenomena that they give (...) rise to, a metaphysical picture of their truth-makers in terms of mechanisms, and an epistemological story connecting characterizing sentences to such concepts as induction and explanation. This paper offers an extended critique of the central truth-conditional component of Nickel’s proposal. In a nutshell, his account has it that ‘Tigers are striped’ is true iff, for tigers, there is a way of being normal with respect to fur-pattern such that all tigers that are normal that way are striped. I begin by explaining what characterizing sentences are and distinguish several readings that are available for sentences with bare plurals in subject position. I then introduce Nickel’s account and discuss some of its predictions which, in my view, seem highly problematic. Moreover, I argue that Nickel’s principle of Homogeneity does not go together well with his proposed truth-conditions, and that his truth-conditional account violates a plausible principle about the logic of generics, a principle I call generic non-contradiction. (shrink)

Cognitive tests show that identity and symmetry reflect intellect. 'Guess of other guess' creates various symmetries, while only one is right: 'absolute symmetry', which can be outvoted by the majority. Prejudices result from differences between ME (my identity) and others. Unbiased judgement is symmetrical, always in the middle: neither in favor, nor against ME. Intelligence reduces prejudices, but the lack of opportunities can counterbalance it. That's why type of bias differs in various groups: people from war zones, people in therapy, (...) artists, etc.. "The law of values' equity" is a symmetrical principle redefining utility in economics, when people equate all their values. E.g. 2 children averagely rich, is better than one child rich and another poor. If 'a' is an average richness, and 'x' is a difference in richness, and Utility multiplies all values, then: a * a > (a - x) * (a + x), which is: a² > a² - x². It does not however imply egalitarianism, as it is still better to have both children rich than both average or poor. (shrink)

Model of intelligence and new methods to assess IQ. MA thesis in 1998 (Comenius University). Art exhibitions "From Animation" London 2013, "Fading Memory" Weißenohe 2015, TAIF Tokyo 2017. Conferences in Santorini, Daejon 2016, Geneva 2017.

Although the cognition is significant in strategic reasoning, its role has been weakly analyzed, because only the average intelligence is usually considered. For example, prisoner's dilemma in game theory, would have different outcomes for persons with different intelligence. I show how various levels of intelligence influence the quality of reasoning, decision, or the probability of psychosis. I explain my original methodology developed for my MA thesis in clinical psychology in 1998, and grant research in 1999, demonstrating the bias of the (...) classic IQ method, and how the intelligence limits thinking. Based on that I defined Personality Model, providing insight into understanding of psychosis (schizophrenia, bi-polar), which has not been explained yet by psychology or psychiatry. In addition, it enables to analyze and assess non-linear problems, utilizable in computer programming, visualization (animation) or other fields including Baduk game. I've already applied some principles in complex information system www.each.co.uk, and video-animations exhibited in London, Germany, Tokyo. I need to mention my experience in chess composition between 1994 and 2000, winning a few international prizes and inventing a special class of fairy rules redefining the mate. The chess composition principles or patterns show the way to organize logical series to higher advanced mechanisms (like calculus), applicable to other fields. One of such principles is a logical aesthetic innovation: new strategy, defined by Italian composers. Finally I show how the simple redefinition of the classic utility concept links economics and psychology to explain irrational / destructive behavior. All presented results (from the research) can be repeated. (shrink)

To support my Phd theses and results of my grant research in 1999, I asked 1) prominent chemist Antonín Holý, author of substances to treat hepatitis and HIV, about the indivisibility of the art and science (published in Slovak Narodna Obroda and Czech blisty,cz), 2) the distinguished economist William Baumol about the alternative activities (published in Slovak Nove Slovo, Czech Respekt and blisty.cz), 3) Nobel Laureate Clive Granger about the significance of the economics (published in 2004 in Czech weekly Tyden). (...) The interviews were exhibited in Holland Park, W8 6LU, The Ice House between 18. Oct - 3. Nov. 2013. (shrink)

About selected philosophical questions of the past and today, with Egon Bondy (1930-2007). In a reaction to his response, I'll add a redefinition of the existential view of decision that is incomplete, and an explanation why 'social science' can be mathematized. The article also include my other ideas which have been developed since 1995. The interview was published in Blisty and Nove Slovo (2003), and some experts were published in The Ice House, Holland Park, London (2013), and Parallax Art Fair (...) (2015). (shrink)

In 1995, as a student of psychology inspired by natural science, I defined a logical model of personality explaining psychosis. I created (for my MA thesis, 1998 and grant research, 1999) new kind of tests assessing intelligence, creativity, prejudices, expectations to show more exact methods in psychology. During my Phd study in economics, I developed 'Maximization of Uniqueness (Originality)' model enhancing the classic utility to explain irrational motivations linking economics and psychology. Later I became computer programmer developing functional programming. According (...) to Personality model (and my experience in chess composition), I've built server and client logic of information system www.each.co.uk, and produced visual art. I presented the excerpts of 'Personality Model' in a few articles, and later as part of my art exhibitions: From Animation (Oct 2013, Holland Park, London), Parallax 12 (Feb 2015, Chelsea Town Hall, London), Fading Memory (Sep 2015, Weißenohe / Nuremberg, Germany). Another work: The Science is a subset of the Art extends Personality Model to art, society. At the end I add example and explanation of a special problem, when the higher intelligence leads to a wrong solution. It was published in Japanese Journal Problem Paradise in 1999. All presented results can be repeated. Computer testing would enable to acquire more data and more exact analysis. (shrink)

1. The two argue: person "A" supports, person "B" refuses evolution... The truth (what is truer) is closer to reality than untruth: the truth improves adaptation 2. If evolution is universally true (anytime), person "A" better adapts to environment, so he gains over person "B" (=natural selection) 3. Statement "evolution is true" is motivated by the 'evolutionary' advantage, so it is biased Summary: Evolution is true, if it is untrue (when it can be unbiased) Exhibited in Holland Park, W8 6LU, (...) The Ice House between 18. Oct - 3. Nov. 2013. (shrink)

Alternate Universes: Religion assumes the other world after death: paradise, hell, nirvana, karma.. Our world is incomplete, because there is truer universe, replicating Plato: behind something is something.. till the true idea - last judgment, karma.. R. Descartes's "I think, therefore I am", is independent of Plato. I'm thinking, regardless of there is truer idea or not. As I'm thinking, I can realize my first idea was false (eg. solving a math problem), and then the Plato's truer idea reappears. Plato (...) and Descartes precede each other as chicken and egg.. Paradox of Religion: Religions' rules (e.g. don't lie) increase chances of future paradise. Hume's: "A" preceding "B" doesn't need to cause "B" turns to: Expectation of "B" can cause "A" NOW Believers expect paradise to forever delay it. Paradise can paradoxically occur only by deviation from the religion... Exhibited in Holland Park, W8 6LU, The Ice House between 18. Oct - 3. Nov. 2013. (shrink)

The interview with economist William Baumol, published in 2003 in weekly Respekt, deals with alternative activities for talented individuals. If they can't pursue productive activities (technological innovations) they go for rent-seeking activities or activities with negligible social return (e.g. chess). I also present a thesis, that if there is no sophisticated alternative activities, the talent may be redirected into pathological ones: psychopathy, neurosis, paranoia, psychosis... The article was exhibited in Holland Park, W8 6LU, The Ice House between 18. Oct - (...) 3. Nov. 2013. (shrink)

Philosophers of mathematics commonly distinguish between explanatory and non-explanatory proofs. An important subclass of mathematical proofs are proofs by induction. Are they explanatory? This paper addresses the question, based on general principles about explanation. First, a recent argument for a negative answer is discussed and rebutted. Second, a case is made for a qualified positive take on the issue.

Los seis textos que se incluyen a continuación contienen una breve reflexión sobre cuestiones de metafísica. A pesar de la diversidad de las temáticas, hay en todas ellas una mirada que les confiere «un aire de familia», a saber, la «mirada metafísica»: «Espiritualidad y religiosidad en Simone Weil», de Natán Verdés; «Metafísica de la psicodelia», de Gerard Masmitjà; «La relación trinitaria en la realidad cosmoteándrica de Raimundo Pánikkar», de Francesc Xavier Marquès; «Introducción a la teología analítica seguida del ejemplo del (...) colapso modal en el teísmo clásico», de Constantí Cabestany; «Metafísica: la ciencia que no avanza», de Albert Piguillem; y «Memorias del subsuelo: un breve análisis filosófico», de Andreu Cacho. (shrink)

Este artículo analiza el recorrido histórico de la antropología del género desde su nacimiento hasta nuestros días. Se pone de manifiesto que esta antropología no puede dar una respuesta integral sobre la pregunta de quién es la persona porque fundamentan sus estudios en la categoría exclusiva de la sexualidad. No puede plantearse como una antropología fi losófi ca al olvidar el resto de facultades y dimensiones propias del ser humano.

Why computer games can be ethical, how players use their ethical values in gameplay, and the implications for game design.

Explanation of logic of psychoses: schizophrenia and bi-polar, with empirical confirmation - e.g. IQ decreases the likelihood of psychosis, and bi-polar is more likely than schizophrenia... MA thesis in 1998 (Comenius University), Presented at Art exhibition "From Animation", London, Holland Park (W8 6LU), Conferences in Santorini, Daejon, Adelaide 2016.

The fundamental problem proponents of truth conditional semantics must face is to specify what role a truth theory is supposed to play within a meaning theory. The most detailed proposal for tackling this problem is the account developed by Ernest Lepore and Kirk Ludwig. However, as I will show in this paper, theories along the lines of Lepore and Ludwig do not suffice to put someone into the position to understand the objectlanguage. The fundamental problem of truth conditional semantics thus (...) remains unsolved. (shrink)

Despite the emergence of computer games as a dominant cultural industry, we know little or nothing about the ethics of computer games. Considerations of the morality of computer games seldom go beyond intermittent portrayals of them in the mass media as training devices for teenage serial killers. In this first scholarly exploration of the subject, Miguel Sicart addresses broader issues about the ethics of games, the ethics of playing the games, and the ethical responsibilities of game designers. He argues (...) that computer games are ethical objects, that computer game players are ethical agents, and that the ethics of computer games should be seen as a complex network of responsibilities and moral duties. Players should not be considered passive amoral creatures; they reflect, relate, and create with ethical minds. The games they play are ethical systems, with rules that create gameworlds with values at play. Drawing on concepts from philosophy and game studies, Sicart proposes a framework for analyzing the ethics of computer games as both designed objects and player experiences. After presenting his core theoretical arguments and offering a general theory for understanding computer game ethics, Sicart offers case studies examining single-player games, multiplayer games, and online gameworlds from an ethical perspective. He explores issues raised by unethical content in computer games and its possible effect on players and offers a synthesis of design theory and ethics that could be used as both analytical tool and inspiration in the creation of ethical gameplay. (shrink)

Recent experimental studies indicate that epistemically irrelevant factors can skew our intuitions, and that some degree of scepticism about appealing to intuition in philosophy is warranted. In response, some have claimed that philosophers are experts in such a way as to vindicate their reliance on intuitions—this has become known as the ‘expertise defence’. This paper explores the viability of the expertise defence, and suggests that it can be partially vindicated. Arguing that extant discussion is problematically imprecise, we will finesse the (...) notion of ‘philosophical expertise’ in order to better reflect the complex reality of the different practices involved in philosophical inquiry. On this basis, we offer a new version of the expertise defence that allows for distinct types of philosophical expertise. The upshot of our approach is that wholesale vindications or rejections of the expertise defence are shown to be unwarranted; we must instead turn to local, piecemeal investigations of philosophical expertise. Lastly, in the spirit of taking our own advice, we exemplify how recent developments from experimental philosophy lend themselves to this approach, and can empirically support one instance of a successful expertise defence. (shrink)

La clase de filosofía, desde la perspectiva del docente, no debe considerarse como una mera actividad transeúnte o predicamental. El presente estudio quiere examinarla, siguiendo la metafísica de la vida de Tomás de Aquino, como una obra vital, que requiere, por un lado, que el profesor se haga una sola cosa —una sola vida, podemos decir— con la doctrina que va a explicar y, por el otro, que esta intelección actual, sin movimiento alguno, dé lugar a la «concepción» y al (...) «parto» de lo entendido en una palabra del corazón, la cual, por su dinamismo intrínseco, tiende, a su vez, a manifestarse exteriormente en una palabra sonora, en un «verbum vocis». Esta exteriorización, por la cual aquella íntima operación que constituye la vida del que filosofa se corporeiza en forma de «diálogo», es, precisamente, la clase de filosofía. La técnica pedagógica debe tener en cuenta el orden intrínseco por el cual la vida humana, mediante la formación de una palabra del corazón, procede a su propia perfección, y no debe olvidar que el perfeccionamiento vital del profesor es causa (instrumental) del perfeccionamiento vital del alumno; es decir, quien no «produce», quien no «engendra», quien no «crea» interiormente lo que está explicando —independientemente de si se trata o no de una novedad— difícilmente ofrecerá unos medios adecuados para que el alumno conciba y dé a luz, en la intimidad de su mente, a un «verbum cordis». (shrink)

Resumen: Este artículo pretende abordar aspectos esenciales del pensamiento de Henri Bergson en la dimensión de las prácticas políticas. Específicamente, esta indagación se centrará en un análisis del sentido de la democracia en Les Deux Sources de la morale et de la religion, en las escuetas, pero decisivas porciones de texto donde esta es abordada. Bajo este objetivo, se podrá extender una discusión de fondo, de carácter ontológico, en torno al rendimiento de una noción de Acontecimiento que pretende servir de (...) reflexión basal en torno al dominio de un concepto de lo político atribuible a este filósofo francés.: This article aims to address essential aspects of Henri Bergson’s thought in the dimension of political practices. Specifically, this inquiry will focus on an analysis of the meaning of democracy in Les Deux Sources de la morale et de la religion, in the succinct, but decisive portions of the text where it is focussed. Under this point, it will be possible to extend a substantive discussion, of an ontological nature, around the performance of a notion of Event that aims to serve as a basal reflection on the domain of a concept of the political attributable to this French philosopher. (shrink)

This essay offers only a broad description of a possible comparison between 'savage democracy' in the terms of Claude Lefort and the 'principle of anarchy' according to Reiner Schurmann. First, I shall try to define savage democracy. Then, in a second move, after having clarified Schurmann's principle of anarchy, I shall outline the terms for a possible confrontation of their respective views. The point here is to show the extent to which the contextualization of democracy with anarchy, considered as principle, (...) is of a nature to bring out democracy's most 'savage' characteristics - but without for all that concealing the difficulties that this perspective provokes or reveals. Indeed, it is precisely by returning to and excavating the gap between anarchy and principle that one most closely approaches the 'savage essence' of democracy. Key Words: anarchy • democracy • domination • Heidegger • Lefort • Machiavelli • politics • savage democracy • Schurmann • totalitarianism. (shrink)

Donald Davidson suggested that, in attempting to give meaning theories, we should proceed via giving truth theories. For the programme of truth-theoretic semantics to be successful, two tasks need to be accomplished. First, it has to be shown that natural languages are actually amendable to truth theoretic treatment. The second task is to show how we can bridge the gap between a truth theory and a genuine meaning theory. This second task is necessitated by the simple fact that truth theories (...) by themselves are too weak to satisfy the central desideratum for a meaning theory. In a recent paper, Greg Ray suggests that the goal of giving meaning theories can easily be achieved, not by supplementing the truth-theoretic apparatus, but by doing away with it altogether. In particular, he proposes that what he calls means-that theories meet all the desiderata on meaning theories, and that ‘anyone with basically Davidsonian commitments must accept the means-that approach as viable and that it has certain evident virtues’. This paper argues that theories along Ray's lines do not satisfy the central desideratum for meaning theories. Ray's belief to the contrary rests on a common misunderstanding of what this desideratum amounts to. As I indicate in the final section of the paper, there perhaps is a way of substantially amending Ray's approach in order to meet the central desideratum. However, in an ironic twist, this will require giving a full-fledged truth theory for the metalanguage, including its intensional constructions like ‘means that’ – precisely the project Ray attempted to avoid. (shrink)

The traditional approach in cognitive sciences holds that cognition is a matter of manipulating abstract symbols followingcertain rules. According to this view, the body is merely an input/output device, which allows the computationalsystem—the brain—to acquire new input data by means of the senses and to act in the environment following its com-mands. In opposition to this classical view, defenders of embodied cognition (EC) stress the relevance of the body inwhich the cognitive agent is embedded in their explanation of cognitive processes. (...) From a representationalist frameworkregarding our conscious experience, in this article, I will offer a novel argument in favor of EC and show that cognitionconstitutively—and no merely causally—depends upon body activity beyond that in the brain. In particular, I will arguethat in order to solve the problem derived from the empirical evidence in favor of the possibility of shifted spectrum,representationalist should endorse the view that experiences concern its subject: the content of experience isde se.Ishow that this claim perfectly matches the phenomenological observation and helps explaining the subjective characterof the experience. Furthermore, I argue that entertaining this kind of representation constitutively depends on bodilyactivity. Consequently, insofar as cognition depends on consciousness, it is embodied. (shrink)

Phenomenology in medicine’s main contribution is to present a first-person narrative of illness, in an effort to aid medicine in reaching an accurate disease diagnosis and establishing a personal relationship with patients whose lived experience changes dramatically when severe disease and disabling condition is confirmed. Once disease is diagnosed, the lived experience of illness is reconstructed into a living-with-disease narrative that medicine’s biological approach has widely neglected. Key concepts like health, sickness, illness, disease and the clinical encounter are being diversely (...) and ambiguously used, leading to distortions in socio-medical practices such as medicalization, pharmaceuticalization, emphasis on surveillance medicine. Current definitions of these concepts as employed in phenomenology of medicine are revised, concluding that more stringent semantics ought to reinforce an empirical phenomenological or postphenomenological approach. (shrink)

In having an experience one is aware of having it. Having an experience requires some form of access to one's own state, which distinguishes phenomenally conscious mental states from other kinds of mental states. Until very recently, Higher-Order (HO) theories were the only game in town aiming at offering a full-fledged account of this form of awareness within the analytical tradition. Independently of any objections that HO theories face, First/Same-Order (F/SO) theorists need to offer an account of such access to (...) become a plausible alternative. My aim in this paper is twofold. In the first place, I wish to widen the logical space of the discussion among theories of consciousness by offering a distinction, orthogonal to that between F/SO and HO theories, between what I will call 'Self-Involving' (SI) and 'Mental-State-Involving' (MSI) theories and argue in favor of the former one. In the second place, I will present the basics of a characterization of such a Self-Involving theory in Same-Order terms. (shrink)

Philosophy affected the birth of Latin America in two ways. First it inspired the famous men who started the independence movements, which led to the definitive liberation from the Spanish yoke. Once the revolution was over, philosophy influenced the development of the legal and political systems that were created to organize the life of the new states.

Higher-Order Thought (HOT) theories of consciousness maintain that the kind of awareness necessary for phenomenal consciousness depends on the cognitive accessibility that underlies reporting. -/- There is empirical evidence strongly suggesting that the cognitive accessibility that underlies the ability to report visual experiences depends on the activity of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC). This area, however, is highly deactivated during the conscious experiences we have during sleep: dreams. HOT theories are jeopardized, as I will argue. I will briefly present HOT (...) theories in the first section. Section 2 offers empirical evidence to the effect that the cognitive accessibility that underlies the ability to report depends on the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex: dlPFC is the neural correlate of HOTs. Section 3 shows the evidence we have of the deactivation of this brain area during dreams and, in section 4, I present my argument. Finally, I consider and rejoin two possible replies that my opponent can offer: the possibility of an alternative neural correlate of HOTs during dreams and the denial that we have phenomenally conscious experiences during sleep. (shrink)